Venezuelan Political Year Begins Unexpectedly in 2025: Surprise Developments Shake Up the Landscape
Rewritten Article:
2025 kicks off with a twist for Nicolás Maduro's government and a blindside for Venezuela's opposition forces. Despite anticipation for a challenging January, marked by Maduro's contested re-inauguration and the beginning of Donald Trump's second term, everything took a unexpected turn.
The massive anti-Maduro protests called for January 9 were no-shows. There were no military uprisings, no foreign interventions to install opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia. Instead, Maduro's re-election process sailed smoothly without any hiccups, while the opposition leadership began to show cracks.
While everyone expected Trump to continue his "maximum pressure" strategy against Maduro, as he did during his first term (2017-2021), the signs were eerily different. Trump made a bold move regarding Venezuela almost immediately: his special envoy, Richard Grenell, met with Maduro at the Miraflores presidential palace under a "zero agenda" framework. This marked a fresh start in bilateral relations.
The tone of the meeting and Marco Rubio's sudden silence, who was once a fierce critic of the Bolivarian Revolution, gave these early "Trump II" weeks an strange twist. Grenell returned to the US with 6 US citizens who had been imprisoned in Venezuela. In a bizarre twist, Chavismo considered Chevron's continued operation in Venezuela's oil sector a win.
Things got more interesting when Venezuela's state airline Conviasa started repatriating undocumented Venezuelan migrants to the US in dignified conditions. This was a major shift as those returning were even welcomed at the airport by Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, one of Washington's most hated figures. This stood in stark contrast to the harsh deportations experienced by Brazilian and Colombian migrants.
This moved has significantly dented the narrative portraying Venezuelan migrants as criminals or Tren de Aragua gang members. It also exposed the opposition's dubious handling of humanitarian aid and their reckless encouragement of people to falsely claim political persecution for asylum purposes.
The Venezuelan government, although reluctant to call Trump a new friend, is cautiously optimistic. Relations are drastically different from his first term, when economic sanctions increased, unilateral coercive measures peaked, and the White House backed the fake "interim government" led by opposition lawmaker Juan Guaidó.
An unexpected twist came with Trump's decision to suspend US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding for Venezuelan opposition parties, NGOs, and media outlets for three months. This confirmed long-standing claims by Venezuelan government officials regarding the continuous flow of funds from the Global North to support destabilization efforts.
This financial cut is a significant blow to the opposition sector that has become dependent on foreign funds, with its leaders more interested in securing financial support than winning votes and attaining power. The temporary suspension of funding also shook the opposition-aligned media landscape, as many outlets were created and sustained through USAID and other US government-linked entities.
Additionally, the scandal has revealed deep divisions within the opposition, with fierce internal disputes over foreign funds, some of which have reportedly ended up in the personal accounts of political leaders. The turmoil caused by Trump's USAID decision has left key figures of the failed "interim government" in disarray, while the collapse of expectations surrounding the January 10 inauguration has weakened the alliance between María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia.
Chavismo, on the other hand, has capitalized on the opposition's disarray and the shifting tone in US-Venezuela relations. Since the start of the year, the government has established a national dialogue table, set dates for parliamentary and gubernatorial elections, and proposed a constitutional reform project. The revolutionary leadership appears firmly in control of the political agenda.
Trapped in an all-or-nothing strategy, Machado has doubled down on calling for an electoral boycott, widening the divide between her faction and the opposition sector advocating participation to build a viable alternative to Chavismo in the medium term. Attempts to delegitimize elected authorities by boycotting elections haven't worked out well in the past – they only serve to consolidate Chavismo's grip on power.
The opposition boycotted the 2005 parliamentary elections, leaving the National Assembly entirely in government hands from 2006 to 2010. They also abstained from elections between 2017 and 2022, including the 2018 presidential race. This allowed Chavismo to regain control of the National Assembly, which had been lost in 2015, and dominated regional and municipal offices. Some opposition leaders and parties did break ranks and participated, securing governorships in Zulia, Táchira, Mérida, Anzoátegui, Cojedes and Nueva Esparta.
If the opposition leadership chooses to abstain from the April 27 parliamentary elections, Chavismo will easily renew its current majority in the National Assembly. This would allow it to approve new laws and constitutional reforms without obstacles.
In the coming weeks, Venezuela's opposition forces will have to make crucial decisions, the most pressing being if they participate in the regional and legislative contests – amid deep internal contradictions. For now, and against many predictions, the government appears to be winning the game.
Clodovaldo Hernández is a journalist and political analyst with experience in higher education. He won the National Journalism Prize (Opinion category) in 2002. He is the author of the books Reinventario (poetry and short stories), De genios y de figuras (journalistic profiles), and Esa larga, infinita distancia (novel).
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelan editorial staff.
Translated by Venezuelanalysis.
- The unexpected meeting between Trump's special envoy and Maduro in January 2025, marked a fresh start in US-Venezuelan relations, shaking the political narrative that portrayed Venezuela as a hotbed of war-and-conflicts and migration crisis.
- The return of undocumented Venezuelan migrants to the US in dignified conditions by Venezuela's state airline Conviasa in early 2025, posed a significant challenge to the crime-and-justice narrative, as those returning were not treated as criminals or Tren de Aragua gang members.
- The temporary suspension of US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding for Venezuelan opposition parties, NGOs, and media outlets for three months in the same year, exposed the dubious handling of humanitarian aid andreckless encouragement of people to falsely claim political persecution for asylum purposes by the opposition.
- With the opposition leadership more interested in securing financial support than winning votes and attaining power, the government is cautiously optimistic about its ongoing policy-and-legislation negotiations with the US, aiming to secure a more stable political future in the coming years.
- The government's proposed constitutional reform project, national dialogue table, and scheduled parliamentary and gubernatorial elections in the near future, show a commitment towards general-news discussions, aiming to secure a return to democracy and a more peaceful Venezuela by 2025.
