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US Withdrawal from Somalia: An Unwise Tactical Error in African Policies

Landed in Mogadishu in December 1992 as an infantry platoon commander, taking part in Operation Restore Hope's initiation. The mission's objective seemed clear to my fellow Marines and me: maintaining peace among warring parties and ensuring the distribution of aid.

US Stepping Back from Somalia: The Tactical Blunder of American Disengagement from Somalia
US Stepping Back from Somalia: The Tactical Blunder of American Disengagement from Somalia

US Withdrawal from Somalia: An Unwise Tactical Error in African Policies

In December 2019, US troops were withdrawn from Somalia, marking a significant shift in the country's security landscape. This decision, part of a broader reassessment of US military presence overseas, was made despite ongoing threats from Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated organization that has resurged to a position of dominance in Somalia since the withdrawal.

The US Special Operations task force, numbering some seven hundred personnel, had been partnering with the Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade, the most capable element of the Somali National Army and the only unit involved in offensive operations. The presence of US forces was a key step against global terrorism, but the withdrawal signaled a change in approach to counterterrorism efforts and regional engagement.

The plan was to win back key terrain outside Mogadishu by focusing on the road networks connecting the capital to provincial cities. However, ten months later, after the death of nineteen US servicemen and hundreds of Somalis in the Battle of Mogadishu, the mission seemed less clear. Today, conditions in Mogadishu are worse in every respect, and the war against al-Shabaab is not going well.

As the international coalition to stabilize Somalia, which includes an African Union force, a United Nations mission, training missions from the European Union, the UK, and Turkey, grapples with the challenges, Washington has the opportunity to reengage in Somalia as part of a coalition effort. If the US wants to avoid the disjointed patchwork of national efforts that caused confusion in Afghanistan, it should take the lead in overall coordination.

Each sub-effort (economic assistance, governmental support, development, security, and building partner capacity) should be assigned to a framework, or lead nation. For instance, the UK, with its newly formed Ranger Regiment and experience of leading a similar project in Sierra Leone, would be a good candidate to take the lead in capacity building. The EU or a nation with experience in conducting overseas relief operations might be induced to lead the effort to enable local and federal administrations to provide basic services and mitigate conditions that support al-Shabaab.

However, a coherent strategy is needed to undermine the causes of civil war in Somalia for the last three decades, combining political, economic, diplomatic, and security efforts with a light military footprint. This administration should instead implement a cross-government and multinational plan, supported by a light military footprint, defining objectives, cost, and acceptable levels of risk.

For Washington to implement such a plan abroad requires a functioning foreign policy establishment at home, with unity of effort among all departments and agencies. The precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan should remind us that Washington needs to take stock before labeling every foreign policy commitment as a "forever war" or "nation building," thus implying intolerable cost.

Looking back, in December 1992, the author was among the first Marines to land in Mogadishu as part of Operation Restore Hope. The mission was to keep warring factions in check and enable the delivery of relief supplies to the population. As we move forward, it is crucial to learn from the past and approach future interventions with a clear, unified strategy.

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