Unmasking the Challenges: The Name Separation Issue Sabotaging Counterterrorism Tactics
In the troubled region of northeastern Nigeria, the landscape of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) has undergone significant change. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad (JAS), formerly known as Boko Haram, have emerged as key players, each with distinct tactics and strategies.
The Nigerian military's adoption of the 'super camp strategy' in 2019, consolidating soldiers into a few, heavily fortified bases, was intended to curb ISWAP's growing number of attacks against military installations. However, this strategy allowed JAS, under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, to thrive. With soldiers too far removed to serve as a deterrent, JAS could murder civilians and raze villages with impunity.
In contrast, ISWAP capitalized on the opportunity provided by the super camp strategy to expand its areas of operations and deepen its ties with communities. The group seeks to win hearts and minds, providing education, health services, and financial assistance to civilians in its areas of operation.
The failure to give nuanced attention to factions of VEOs can lead to suboptimal policies to address them. For instance, the death of Shekau does not necessarily mean an end to jihadist activity in northeastern Nigeria, as the group has long since split into new factions. The death of Shekau may be a bad omen for stability in the Lake Chad area, as his downfall has presumably strengthened the position of what might be considered the more dangerous jihadist group in northeastern Nigeria: ISWAP.
Identifying fragmentation within and across VEOs is crucial for crafting strategies that account for groups' individual tactics and strategies. The Boko Haram disaggregation problem refers to the tendency to corral all iterations of jihadist groups in northeastern Nigeria under the name 'Boko Haram' even as the group has long since split into new factions. Understanding how the factions differ significantly will offer clarity regarding the groups' specific goals and guide kinetic counterterrorism activities and nonkinetic efforts to counter violent extremism.
The fragmentation within the Boko Haram group is caused by the combination of the increasing number of actors in the conflict, including the blurred lines between state and non-state actors such as private security companies, warlords, and paramilitaries, which complicates communication and negotiation and leads to internal splits.
The United States and other foreign actors have often attempted to apply a one-size-fits-all counterterrorism approach, which has led to disappointing outcomes. Effective efforts to counter VEOs depend on crafting carefully tailored approaches unique to each VEO in question, understanding not only their kinetic capabilities but also their interactions with the public.
The strategy tailored to one group's targeting tactics (ISWAP) allowed the other group (JAS) nearly free range to conduct its violence. The super camp strategy too narrowly focused on ISWAP's armed capabilities, rather than addressing the root causes of JAS's persistence. The importance of paying acute attention to ground-level affinities has never been more important, as there are rumors that the groups may now be merging again.
Boko Haram terrorized the civilian population of northeastern Nigeria and kidnapped hundreds of schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014. JAS, one of the factions that emerged from Boko Haram, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in March 2015 and became ISWAP. In August 2016, the Islamic State released an announcement that Abubakar Shekau had been replaced as the leader of ISWAP by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, resulting in a split between the two factions.
The Boko Haram disaggregation problem is a real-world policy implication, as relying on flawed assumptions and incomplete data can lead to ill-informed policy. The failure to address each faction of VEOs as a distinct entity can lead to suboptimal policies and continued violence in northeastern Nigeria. As the landscape of VEOs continues to evolve, a nuanced understanding of each group's tactics, strategies, and interactions with the public is crucial for crafting effective counterterrorism policies.
