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U.S. President Nixon Threatens 'Violent' Action Against India if They Attack Pakistan

US State Department documents unveil Nixon's personal guarantees to Pakistan following the 1971 conflict, along with his cautions to India, and Islamic Republic's covert proposal for military facilities to the United States.

United States Threatens Retaliation if India Attacks Pakistan with Violence, as Perposed by Nixon
United States Threatens Retaliation if India Attacks Pakistan with Violence, as Perposed by Nixon

U.S. President Nixon Threatens 'Violent' Action Against India if They Attack Pakistan

In March 1971, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers sent a significant memorandum to President Richard Nixon, titled 'President Bhutto's Proposals for Closer Military Collaboration'. This marked the beginning of a shift in US involvement in India-Pakistan relations following the 1971 war.

The US strategy during this period centred on staunch support for Pakistan, primarily due to Cold War dynamics and the US's interest in using Pakistan as a conduit to open relations with China. In Oval Office discussions, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger displayed a clear bias towards Pakistan, viewing it as a strategic ally. This tilt in US policy, despite the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), led to controversial actions such as military posturing against India.

Nixon and Kissinger were concerned with containing India's regional dominance and preventing it from decisively defeating Pakistan or gaining control over disputed territories like Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The US not only cut off formal military aid to both countries but also sent the nuclear-capable aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal as a show of force, signalling support for Pakistan during the war.

Despite awareness of atrocities committed by the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, Nixon and Kissinger downplayed or ignored reports from US diplomats in Dhaka, prioritising geopolitical strategy over humanitarian concerns. Their hostility towards Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was evident in derogatory remarks recorded in declassified transcripts after Gandhi’s pleas for US intervention against the genocide.

Kissinger believed that an Indian attack was unlikely before President Nixon's upcoming summit in Moscow or for some time afterward. The suspended $87 million in US military aid to Pakistan would not be restored, but Nixon's stance towards Pakistan was described as one of "very warm feelings".

Pakistan was also working on improving relations with Afghanistan. Kissinger recalled the difficult period during the India-Pakistan war in December 1971 and expressed goodwill towards Pakistan. Ghias Uddin Ahmed, Pakistan's Defence Secretary, expressed the need for credible deterrence against India.

The memo outlined offers from Pakistan, highlighting its strategic importance to the United States, including potential port access and tracking station facilities along the Arabian Sea. Aziz Ahmed, the secretary-general of Pakistan's foreign ministry, expressed concern over India's military posture, claiming that three Army divisions had been moved to the West Pakistani border and the Indian Army chief had travelled to Moscow.

Gwadar, a potential deep-water port, was flagged as a location that could significantly boost the economic development of the surrounding region. Ahmed suggested that India might be preparing to put pressure on Pakistan during negotiations or launch a more serious offensive. There were suggestions that India could attempt to seize "Azad" (Pakistan-occupied) Kashmir, although Chinese assessments indicated such a move would be unlikely before Nixon's Moscow visit.

In March 1972, a closed-door meeting took place in the Oval Office between US President Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Aziz Ahmed, senior American and Pakistani officials. The conversations between Nixon, Kissinger, and other officials in the months following the war are preserved in the US State Department Archives.

Nixon's assessment of the subcontinent was that both India and Pakistan were too poor and too bloodthirsty. Pakistan's Defence Secretary Ghias Uddin Ahmed expressed the need for credible deterrence against India. Ambassador Keating suggested a regional framework similar to the European Economic Community for stability. Kissinger assured the Pakistani side that the US would not let Pakistan down and would react violently if there was another attack.

References: [1] Gopal, S., & Tanter, R. (2005). The South Asian Crisis of 1971: A Documentary History. Columbia University Press. [2] Khosla, R. (2011). Architect of the India-US Entente: A Biography of Henry A. Kissinger. Oxford University Press.

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