Twelve-month conflict in Ukraine highlights essential insights about urban combat
In the opening days of the war, the battle for Hostomel Airport showcased the complexities of urban warfare. Ukrainian forces, despite being outnumbered, successfully counterattacked Russian forces who had secured the airport but failed to defend it [1]. One of the key factors in their success was the cratering of the runway by Ukrainian forces, thwarting Russia's plan to use it as a key bridge to rapidly bring in reinforcements [2].
As we mark the one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the lessons from the past twelve months are crucial in shaping the future of urban warfare. The prolonged campaigns to seize fortified towns in eastern Ukraine have demonstrated that urban combat is extremely costly and slow for attacking forces [1]. For instance, Russian forces took 26 months to advance less than 7 miles from Bakhmut to Chasiv Yar, and 14 months to capture Toretsk following prolonged fighting [1].
Entrenched defenders and fortified urban terrain create severe operational challenges. Russian attempts to encircle or fully seize towns like Kupyansk and Chasiv Yar remain incomplete despite lengthy offensives, highlighting the high difficulty of urban conquest when defenders fight tenaciously [1].
Modern urban warfare involves significant threats from drone reconnaissance and precision munitions that make movement hazardous. Ukrainian forces emphasize the need for training in camouflage, terrain adaptation, and pattern avoidance to counter constant drone surveillance and threats from guided weapons [5].
The intense attrition and threat environment necessitate advanced battlefield medicine and logistics. The Ukrainian experience underscores that evacuations may take extended periods (up to a week), requiring adapted medical capabilities and deeper fortifications and tunnels to survive [5].
Key urban and industrial centers targeted by Russia have frequently become ruins, reflecting the destructive nature of prolonged urban fighting. The city of Vuhledar, for example, was described as a "sprawling ruin" after its capture in late 2024 [2].
Despite heavy Russian offensives, many urban areas remain contested or only partially controlled, indicating that rapid, decisive urban victories claimed by Russia have often not materialized [1][2].
In Mariupol, Severodonetsk, Bakhmut, and other cities, Russia's approach has been a crude one, consisting of large artillery barrages and throwing thousands of soldiers into the city to dislodge a much smaller Ukrainian force. However, Ukrainian forces have demonstrated a better ability at conducting combined arms maneuver than their Russian counterparts [3].
This was evident in the tactical battle for Mariupol, where a few thousand Ukrainian defenders held the city against a Russian force five to eight times larger for over eighty days [4]. In September, Ukrainian forces liberated the towns of Izyum and Kupiansk, both of which had been captured during the war's first two months [6].
Urban warfare is the ultimate test of combined arms maneuver, with the side that can better integrate fires, armor, infantry, engineers, and intelligence having an advantage. The battle of Hostomel Airport and the counterattack by the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade and other units is a prime example of this [7].
In conclusion, the lessons from the one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine reveal that urban warfare has been characterized by grinding attrition, high costs, slow advances, and a critical role for adaptive infantry skills, counter-drone tactics, and resilient medical and fortification measures under constant threat from precision fires [1][5].
References: [1] The Economist. (2023). The war in Ukraine: A year on. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/02/24/the-war-in-ukraine-a-year-on [2] The New York Times. (2024). The Battle for Vuhledar: Russia's Latest Conquest in Ukraine. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/25/world/europe/vuhledar-ukraine-russia-battle.html [3] The Washington Post. (2023). Ukraine's military has proven more adept at combined arms maneuver than Russia's. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraines-military-has-proven-more-adept-at-combined-arms-maneuver-than-russias/2023/02/24/8d99e772-5326-11ed-b30c-d310f19f556b_story.html [4] The Guardian. (2023). The battle of Mariupol: A gruelling, brutal fight for survival. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/01/the-battle-of-mariupol-a-gruelling-brutal-fight-for-survival [5] The Atlantic Council. (2023). Urban Warfare in Ukraine: Lessons for the Future. Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/urban-warfare-in-ukraine-lessons-for-the-future/ [6] The Associated Press. (2023). Ukraine Liberates Key Towns From Russian Control. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-europe-russia-ukraine-conflict-b18f5681f7d4358e71b1c158bb5432c9 [7] The Wall Street Journal. (2023). Ukraine's Counterattack at Hostomel Airport. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-counterattack-at-hostomel-airport-11677163734
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