Taiwan Struggles with Miscommunication: John J. Tkacik's Perspective on Taiwan's Language Barrier Issue
In 1971, Henry Kissinger embarked on a covert mission to China, pondering whether to have the meeting taped in Pakistan or China. He opted for the latter, trusting the Chinese to do the recording, translation, and transcription. Thanks to this decision, historians now have thousands of pages of verbatim transcripts from Kissinger's negotiations with his Chinese counterparts.
Interestingly, Chinese stenographers produced English-language typescripts faster than their Chinese counterparts. This was due, in part, to the skepticism Kissinger and Nixon held towards their State Department interpreters, believing they were more loyal to their Foreign Service fraternity than to the White House. In fact, they trusted the Chinese side to keep secrets, as evidenced by their refusal to allow any American interpreters in their secret meetings with China's leaders.
This lack of American interpreters proved beneficial for maintaining the Nixonian secrecy but disastrous for Kissinger, who kept no secrets from his Chinese friends. During his conversations with Chinese leaders, Kissinger even encouraged Chinese security services to listen in on his phone calls with the State Department's skeptical diplomats.
After a tense debate with the Nixon delegation's State Department contingent on the Shanghai Communique's Taiwan language, Kissinger begged Chinese indulgence, admitting that he hoped the Chinese were listening to his phone calls. This was a common occurrence, with the Chinese spy services tapping phones, using hidden microphones, and otherwise monitoring all the American delegation's conversations in China.
In 2006, the State Department declassified these transcripts, providing a "comprehensive" record of Kissinger's colloquies with the Chinese. While these documents offer a fascinating glimpse into history, it remains to be seen how many historians have delved into the intricacies of these conversations and understood the context in which they were embedded.
Kissinger's lack of an American interpreter proved a handicap from his very first encounter with Chinese premier Chou En-lai on July 9, 1971. During the encounter, Chou probed Kissinger about the US view of Taiwan's legal status. When Kissinger and his team proved oblivious to the connection between Edgar Snow's interview with Mao Zedong and the Taiwan issue, the Premier preemptively set the record straight.
Kissinger's uninformed responses highlighted his lack of understanding of Taiwan history, a failing that would plague him throughout his dealings with the Chinese. His neglect or disdain for Taiwan contrasted sharply with his careful diplomatic maneuvering with the Chinese, underscoring the complexities and challenges of the Taiwan issue in US-China relations.
- Despite the unavailability of American interpreters during his conversations with Chinese leaders, Kissinger willingly encouraged Chinese security services to monitor his phone calls with the State Department's diplomats, suggesting a general-news angle of Kissinger's complex trust dilemma in his interactions with the Chinese.
- The absence of American interpreters in Kissinger's first encounter with Chinese premier Chou En-lai in 1971 left him unprepared to address the Taiwan issue, creating political complications that highlighted Kissinger's lack of understanding of Taiwan history and underscored the intricacies of US-China relations regarding the Taiwan issue.
