Syria's rebels claim that Western intervention has empowered jihadist groups within Syria.
A Tale from ALEPPO: The Shift towards the Evolution of Rebellion
In the heart of ALEPPO, Syria, the narrative of the rebellion against Bashar Assad has taken an intriguing turn. Rebel leaders here boldly announce the growing influence of Islamist ideologies within their ranks, a consequence they attribute, in part, to Western hesitance in support.
These leaders spoke candidly about their decision to join the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Nusra Front, a move they made last week in rejection of the Western-backed National Coalition and its Syrian Military Council. A joint statement declared, "We do not recognize [the Coalition]... We call on everyone fighting to topple the Syrian president to unite under a clear Islamic context that... is based on sharia (Islamic law), making it the sole source of legislation."
The ambition here appears to be the creation of an ultra-conservative Islamic state in Syria, an aspiration that has sparked concerns in the West about the increasing radicalization of the rebellion. Ahmad Jarba, the Coalition's chief, expressed this worry by stating that extremists are trying to "steal our revolution."
The rebellion in ALEPPO has always been a conglomerate — a mix of varying groups, from Western-style liberals to mostly moderate Muslims, and, unfortunately, a small number of jihadists. As recently reported by defense consultancy IHS Jane’s, the number of hard-line Islamists among an estimated 100,000 rebels is nearly half the total.
One commander, Abu Ammar, placed the blame for the shift squarely at the feet of President Barack Obama. "The United States promised the people of Syria that it would not allow Assad to cross the red line and would attack, but it was all lies," he said, referencing Obama's threat to hit Syria over a chemical weapons attack that killed hundreds in August.
"The people of Aleppo have no faith in the international community or the promises of the West," Abu Ammar claimed, explaining the motivation for allying with Islamists and groups linked to Al-Qaeda.
The move towards Al-Nusra is not purely pragmatic, though. It also stems from a desire for ideological alignment. Abu Mohammed, a Sunni Muslim imam who acts as a sort of chaplain to the men of theLiwa Al-Tawhid group, puts it this way: "The United States and the West are... radicalizing people. In the face of their indifference, we have begun aligning with Al-Qaeda, because it is they who are fighting and dying for us while the world just looks on."
Rebel fighters have long resented the fact that most of the opposition's political and military leadership lives abroad. Abu Abeida, a commander of another brigade that signed the declaration, Shabab Al-Daraa, expressed this sentiment bluntly: "You can't talk about Syria from Turkey. We don't want to have anything to do with politicians who are not inside Syria fighting with us."
Though it's a complex web of factors that led to the shift towards Al-Nusra in ALEPPO, strategic alliances forged out of shared Islamic ideologies, the military and organizational strength of Al-Nusra, pragmatic survival strategies, and the appeal of social services and governance offered by the group are key. The fragmented opposition landscape, intense local rivalries, and the quest for control over key territories have further fueled this alliance.
This shift in ALEPPO illustrates the intricate interplay of ideology, local rivalries, and battlefield necessities in the Syrian conflict.
Insights:Smaller or weaker rebel factions often join groups like Al-Nusra/HTS for strategic reasons, such as seeking military support, resources, and protection. The ultraradical Sunni Islamist ideology of Salafism, espoused by Al-Nusra/HTS, attracts many fighters and groups seeking a state governed by Islamic law. Al-Nusra/HTS has maintained relatively strong military capabilities and gained local support through providing social and administrative services in areas they controlled. The Syrian Civil War's highly competitive and fractured opposition landscape has helped drive some groups to join stronger, better-organized factions like Al-Nusra/HTS. Intense local rivalries, particularly in ALEPPO, have also contributed to the shift towards Al-Nusra/HTS.
- The alliance between smaller rebel factions and Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Nusra Front in ALEPPO has been largely driven by the desire for shared Islamic ideology, as stated by Sunni Muslim imam, Abu Mohammed.
- In addition to ideological alignment, pragmatic survival strategies have also driven the shift towards Al-Nusra, as acknowledged by commander Abu Ammar who blames President Barack Obama for the lack of Western intervention, leading to a loss of faith in the international community.
- Strategic alliances with Al-Nusra have been found attractive due to the group's military and organizational strength and their provision of social services and governance in the areas they controlled, as seen in the alliance formed by the Liwa Al-Tawhid group.
- The highly competitive and fractured opposition landscape of the Syrian conflict has also contributed to the shift towards Al-Nusra, with smaller and weaker factions seeking to join stronger, better-organized groups for protection and resources, as demonstrated by the alliance between Shabab Al-Daraa and Al-Nusra.
- The intense local rivalries within ALEPPO, such as the resistance towards the leadership living abroad and the quest for control over key territories, have further fueled the alliance between the rebels and Al-Nusra, as expressed by commander Abu Abeida of Shabab Al-Daraa.
