Strategies for preventing conflict resolution: Insights from Ukraine and Russia's previous truce arrangements
A fresh take on the current ceasefire proposal between Ukraine and the United States:
The recent peace proposal presented by the U.S. and agreed upon by Ukraine is part of a broader plan, according to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, "to bring an end to this ongoing conflict in a lasting and sustainable manner."
It's a risky endeavor for Ukraine, as previous peace accords with Russia haven't been particularly successful. Ten years ago in February, a peace agreement between the two nations only led to sporadic violence, mounting distrust, and ultimately, a full-scale war.
Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelensky, expressed skepticism during an interview with CNN affiliate CNN Turk last month. He cautioned, "If you can make Putin stop the war, that's fantastic. But be aware that he can deceive. He did that to me after the Minsk ceasefire."
The Minsk accords, signed in September 2014, and again in February 2015 (as Minsk II), aimed to put an end to the bloody conflict between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region. Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE were signatories to these accords.
Although these accords were never fully implemented, violence persisted for the seven years that followed. Currently, Ukraine and its allies are attempting to find another path towards peace, but experts warn that the failures of Minsk serve as cautionary tales, and the risks of history repeating are high. Here are the key lessons learned:
1. A strong military is essential
In 2015, Western military aid to Ukraine was minimal, primarily limited to non-lethal supplies. The Obama administration did provide some defensive military equipment. In a speech at the 2015 Munich Security Conference, then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized that the crisis "cannot be resolved by military means." Her assessment of those diplomatic efforts was straightforward: "It's uncertain whether they'll succeed."
The Minsk accords were signed during significant military defeats for Ukraine. The first agreement followed what's believed to be the deadliest episode of the conflict in the Donbas, at Ilovaisk. In late August 2014, hundreds of Ukrainian troops were killed as they tried to flee the town to avoid encirclement. Six months later, Minsk II was signed while fierce fighting raged for another Donetsk town, Debaltseve. The battle continued for several days beyond the initial ceasefire deadline.
Due to these military setbacks, Ukraine and its allies were at a disadvantage in the negotiations. Marie Dumoulin, a diplomat at the French Embassy in Berlin at the time, explained that Russia, through its proxies and directly, was in a stronger position on the battlefield, allowing them to put additional pressure on the negotiations.
From a military standpoint, Ukraine's Western-backed, almost million-strong army today is a stark contrast to the underfunded and under-equipped force that faced the Russian-backed separatists in 2014. However, as Ukraine accepts a temporary ceasefire proposal, it faces a double challenge.
Firstly, Russia has been advancing in the eastern region (albeit at great cost to personnel and equipment), and regularly launching aerial attacks on Ukraine's cities. Secondly, the U.S., Ukraine's primary ally, has withheld crucial military aid in response to a disagreement between Zelensky and U.S. President Donald Trump. Although the aid has now been restored, the incident has left Ukraine in a precarious position.
Sabine Fischer, a senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, noted, "Ukraine's situation is now very precarious. Ukraine, from the Trump administration's perspective, has become an obstacle to this normalization they want for their relationship with Russia."
2. No hasty deals
Experts agree that the Minsk accords were hastily put together, as violence escalated. Johannes Regenbrecht, a former German civil servant who was involved in the negotiations, pointed out in a recent paper that Ukraine's allies had reached a point where they feared allowing Russia to continue unchecked "would have led to the de facto secession of eastern Ukraine under Moscow's control."
The resulting document left too much ambiguity when it came to implementing the deal, particularly regarding how to link the military provisions (a ceasefire and weapons withdrawal) with the political ones (local elections and a "special regime" in the separatist-controlled areas).
Dumoulin, now director of the Wider Europe program at the European Council on Foreign Relations, explained the initial disagreement as an early sign of Russia's ultimate intention to use the political provisions of Minsk to gain greater control over Ukraine. Sabine Fischer argues that Trump's desire for a quick resolution suggests the U.S. may be at risk of reaching a flawed deal in haste, and may even be accepting a deal that does not offer long-term solutions.
3. Be wary of false narratives
In the end, the biggest issue with the Minsk accords wasn't what was included, but what wasn't. There was not a single mention of "Russia" in the entire document, despite clear evidence that Russia was both arming the separatists and sending reinforcements from the Russian army.
"Everyone knew that Russia was involved," said Dumoulin. "The agreements were based on the fiction that the war was between separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk and Kyiv, and that it was ultimately a domestic conflict."
Though there is no direct parallel today, there is a risk that Russia may now be using a false narrative to portray Zelensky as illegitimate, due to his failure to hold elections (as per Ukrainian law, elections cannot be held during martial law). This narrative may be used to rebrand the war as something that should be resolved internally within Ukraine, ultimately leading to regime change.
The failure of the Minsk accords leaves no doubt as to the risks of perpetuating such falsehoods.back then, the fiction that Russia was not an aggressor or a party to the conflict, along with insufficient pressure on Moscow in the form of sanctions or the provision of lethal military supplies to Ukraine, meant that Minsk never addressed the root cause of the conflict.
"The fundamental contradiction of Minsk," wrote Regenbrecht, "was that Putin sought to end Ukraine as an independent nation... Consequently, he had no interest in a constructive political process." There's no evidence that this position has changed. In his speech on February 21, 2022, three days before the full-scale invasion, Putin described Ukraine as "an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space," before claiming, "Ukraine actually never had stable traditions of real statehood." In January this year, one of his closest aides, Nikolai Patrushev, stated he couldn't rule out "that Ukraine will cease to exist at all in the coming year." And so, even amid US promises of keeping Ukraine out of NATO and forcing them to accept territorial losses, the negotiating teams in Saudi Arabia have, thus far, come nowhere close to addressing the core issue.
- Strengthening the military is crucial for Ukraine in its future negotiations with Russia, as the lack of military aid in 2015 left Ukraine at a disadvantage during the Minsk negotiations, with Russia holding a stronger position on the battlefield.
- The world should be cautious about agreeing to hasty deals without thoroughly addressing the ambiguities, as the Minsk accords were hastily put together and left too much ambiguity when it came to implementing the deal.
- Europe should be wary of being deceived by false narratives, as the Minsk accords failed in part due to the fiction that Russia was not an aggressor or a party to the conflict, allowing the root cause of the conflict to remain unaddressed.
