Russia Allegedly Launches Duplicate Propaganda Offensive Against Poland's Upcoming 2025 Presidential Vote
In the run-up to Poland's presidential election slated for May 18, the European Union's disinformation watchdogs have revealed that Russian influence operations are aiming to manipulate public discourse in the country. According to a joint report by Alliance4Europe and Lithuania-based Debunk.org, the long-standing "Operation Doppelganger" disinformation campaign has been refocused on the Polish electorate.
The latest tactics employed by Russia involve the impersonation of Polish media, spreading false narratives about the war in Ukraine, and undercutting public faith in the Polish government and NATO. This operation seems to be an extension of a larger campaign used against Western countries during critical elections and geopolitical moments.
Russia's information warfare techniques are reminiscent of "Operation Doppelganger," which was first exposed in 2022. This campaign involves creating fake websites that mirror the design and URL structure of legitimate European media outlets, publishing false or distorted content aligned with Kremlin narratives, and distributing it through coordinated social media campaigns using automated bots and inauthentic accounts.
The recent iteration of this operation targeting Poland includes links to forged versions of leading Polish news platforms, such as TVN24, Onet, Interia, and Wprost. Analysts state that these links enable disinformation actors to exploit the trust readers place in familiar news brands, amplifying the reach and impact of false narratives.
Between March 4 and April 4, researchers discovered 279 posts on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter) linking to 13 major Polish media brands. Many of these links led to fake websites rather than the actual news portals they mimicked. The content of these fake articles included anti-Ukrainian sentiment, criticisms of Western sanctions on Russia, and allegations that Poland's support for Ukraine is detrimental to its economy and international standing. Additionally, other articles attacked Polish political figures like incumbent President Andrzej Duda and candidates running in the upcoming election.
One prevalent narrative falsely claimed that Polish troops were being secretly deployed to Ukraine, risking direct conflict with Russia. Another repeated the baseless assertion that Ukrainian refugees are receiving preferential treatment over Polish citizens. Researchers caution that the timing of these messages is not coincidental, given that the Polish presidential election is seen as a crucial test for democratic stability in the region. Russia's efforts appear aimed at fueling political divisions, undermining public trust in government institutions, and reducing electoral turnout.
While the primary language of these disinformation posts was Polish, some messages were in English and German, suggesting that the campaign may also target external perceptions of Poland's political climate and international role. Disinformation specialists note that the operation's reach was contained but highly coordinated, with similar posts appearing across multiple fake accounts within minutes of each other, indicating the use of automation tools and pre-planned content schedules.
In response to the report, Poland's Ministry of Digital Affairs reaffirmed its commitment to cyber and information security, stressing that electoral integrity remains a national priority. The Ministry confirmed it is working with EU partners and independent fact-checkers to monitor and counter disinformation campaigns.
The European External Action Service also criticized Russia's continued use of information operations to interfere in democratic processes within EU member states. Experts underscore that the greatest defense against such operations is a combination of technical safeguards and increased public awareness. Krzysztof Izdebski, a digital governance expert, highlights the importance of teaching media literacy at all levels of education, stating that recognizing disinformation involves critical thinking. Fact-checking organizations like Debunk.org have launched educational campaigns to help voters identify fake sites and verify sources. They suggest cross-checking URLs, comparing articles with those on official platforms, and reporting suspicious content to trusted watchdogs.
As Poland approaches a pivotal presidential election, the resurgence of Operation Doppelganger provides a sobering reminder of the evolving nature of foreign interference. While the scope of the campaign remains relatively limited, its intent is clear: to destabilize the information environment and weaken democratic institutions. Vigilance, transparency, and cooperation between civil society, media, and government will be essential to ensure that the Polish public can vote freely from foreign manipulation.
- This Operation Doppelganger, refocused on the Polish electorate, employs tactics similar to a larger campaign used against Western countries, manipulating public discourse through impersonation of Polish media, false narratives about the war in Ukraine, and undermining faith in the Polish government and NATO.
- The fake websites, designed to mirror legitimate Polish news outlets, publish content aligned with Kremlin narratives and are distributed through coordinated social media campaigns, using automated bots and inauthentic accounts.
- Links to forged versions of leading Polish news platforms, like TVN24, Onet, Interia, and Wprost, are being used to exploit trust readers place in familiar news brands, amplifying the reach and impact of false narratives.
- Recent disinformation posts on social media platform X, commonly criticized narratives involving anti-Ukrainian sentiment, criticisms of Western sanctions on Russia, and allegations that Poland's support for Ukraine is detrimental to its economy and international standing.
- Falsely claimed that Polish troops are being secretly deployed to Ukraine, risking direct conflict with Russia, or that Ukrainian refugees are receiving preferential treatment over Polish citizens.
- The forthcoming Polish presidential election is a crucial test for democratic stability in the region, and disinformation campaigns may aim at fueling political divisions, undermining public trust in government institutions, and reducing electoral turnout.
- While the primary language of these disinformation posts was Polish, some messages were in English and German, suggesting that the campaign may target external perceptions of Poland's political climate and international role.
- The Ministry of Digital Affairs is working with EU partners and independent fact-checkers to monitor and counter disinformation campaigns, and increased public awareness, media literacy through education at all levels, recognizing disinformation, and cross-checking URLs, comparing articles with those on official platforms, and reporting suspicious content are key defense mechanisms against such operations.
