Relationship Improvement Celebrated Between Israel and Gulf Nations
In a significant development for the Middle East, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain has reshaped regional alliances and security architecture. The agreements, part of the Abraham Accords, have created a new strategic front against perceived threats from Iran and Turkey, while opening avenues for economic and diplomatic opportunities.
The UAE and Israel view Iran as an existential threat, and their newfound relations foster intelligence sharing and military collaboration, including access by the UAE to advanced U.S. military technology like the F-35 fighter jet. These accords also bolster the Gulf states’ ties to the United States, partly offsetting concerns about diminishing American military commitments in the region.
The normalization has catalyzed rapid growth in trade, tourism, technological innovation, and interfaith dialogue between Israel and the normalization partners. For instance, trade between Israel and Bahrain surged by over 800% in 2024 compared to 2023.
However, the normalization complicates the traditional Arab stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The UAE conditionally accepted Israel’s halt to West Bank annexation plans as part of its deal, signaling a break from the previous norm. The Palestinian leadership and Iran strongly reject the accords, viewing them as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause and a weakening of traditional Arab support.
While the UAE and Bahrain maintain rhetorical commitments to Palestinian aspirations, their pragmatic realpolitik approach prioritizes economic and security interests over active mediation or pressure on Israel, thereby changing the dynamics surrounding Palestinian statehood ambitions. Saudi Arabia’s position remains cautious, balancing its religious identification with Palestinians and the strategic need to counter Iran.
Jürgen Hardt, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group's foreign affairs spokesman, has welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain. He believes that these rapprochements could serve as an impetus for the realization of a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. Hardt suggests that former rivals and adversaries in the region could become partners that foster economic and social dynamism.
However, Hardt reiterates that the realization of a two-state solution would require courageous and visionary steps. He does not address any potential challenges or obstacles that may arise from the normalization of relations between Israel and the Gulf states.
In summary, the normalization agreements contribute to a realignment of Middle East security by building a front against Iran and boosting U.S.-Gulf-Israel cooperation while opening significant economic and diplomatic opportunities. However, they also undermine the traditional Arab consensus linking peace to Palestinian statehood, complicate Palestinian diplomatic leverage, and incite opposition from Iran and Palestinian groups, thus making the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more complex but potentially opening new regional security frameworks.
The policy-and-legislation in the Middle East is expected to evolve as a response to the normalization of relations between Israel, UAE, and Bahrain, with potentially altered stances towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, given the UAE's conditionally accepting Israel’s halt to West Bank annexation plans. The normalization may also lead to other Gulf states adopting a pragmatic realpolitik approach towards Israel and the Palestinian issue, obliquely affecting the general-news component of Middle Eastern politics.
