Putin's military tactics in Ukraine bear a resemblance to those employed by the Islamic State.
In a stark and unsettling revelation, experts are drawing comparisons between the methods of warfare employed by the Islamic State (IS) and Russian forces, particularly in Ukraine. While the nature of their conflicts may differ, both parties share similar strategic dimensions in their pursuit of territorial control and psychological dominance.
One of the most striking similarities is the use of intense airstrikes and persistent combat operations. In Syria, Russian forces conducted around 60 airstrikes daily, targeting ISIS oil trade and supply routes to cripple the group's economic resources and mobility. This extensive aerial campaign was central to regaining territory and weakening ISIS infrastructure. In Ukraine, Russia has similarly employed intense and sustained military operations on multiple fronts over a large geographical area, aiming to seize key cities and strategic positions through relentless offensives.
Both IS and Russian forces focus on disrupting enemy supply and economic networks. In Syria, the Russian intervention notably targeted over 200 oil facilities and thousands of petroleum transports, crippling ISIS's funding sources. While direct parallels are less explicit regarding economic targets in Ukraine, control over supply routes, logistics, and critical infrastructure—such as roads, railways, and energy facilities—has been a key Russian tactic, reflecting a similar strategic logic of disruption to the opponent’s sustainment.
Command and control approaches involving centralized but flexible leadership are another shared characteristic. Russian military operations, both in Syria and Ukraine, show a pattern of adapting command structures, with central figures given autonomy but coordinated centrally. For example, Russia appointed commanders with counterinsurgency experience in Syria, while in Ukraine, command was centralized under generals like Aleksandr Dvornikov to improve coordination after initial setbacks. Similarly, the Islamic State also maintained centralized leadership but allowed local commanders operational freedom to exploit battlefield opportunities, enabling swift and flexible action.
However, it is in the use of terror tactics and high-impact attacks against civilians that the parallels between the two warring parties are most evident. IS is notorious for terror attacks targeting civilians to spread fear, destabilize regimes, and undermine morale. Examples include suicide bombings and attacks on symbolic sites like shrines and public gatherings in Iran, Russia, and Turkey. While conventional warfare in Ukraine differs, Russian forces have been accused and documented of actions causing civilian casualties and destruction—including sieges and bombardments on urban areas—intended to demoralize the Ukrainian population and force submission.
Both IS and Russia have also engaged in proxy or hybrid warfare contexts. In Syria, Russia’s intervention supported the Assad regime against insurgents including ISIS, employing a model based on counterinsurgency and complex urban combat. In Ukraine, Russia initially used hybrid warfare tactics, such as covert support for separatists before full-scale invasion, which shares similarities with irregular warfare tactics associated with Islamist insurgent groups, including indirect control and using proxy entities.
The modus operandi of IS paid off, with the organisation becoming the dominant armed organisation in Raqqa city by September 2013, relying on urban terrorism tactics and infiltration operations. In Ukraine, Russian forces have employed tactics similar to those used by the Islamic State Organisation (IS), starting from February 2014 in Crimea and April 2014 in the Donbas. The case of rapist-officer Colonel Yuri Budanov of the 160 Tank Guards Regiment, during the first and second Chechen wars, is infamous due to allegations of rape by Amnesty International, Memorial, and other human rights organisations. In 2022, the similarities between IS and Putin's ways of warfare are pronounced, with the demonstration of extreme brutality, alleged executions of prisoners of war, identity-based executions, rape, and other forms of sexual violence being used as tools of psychological warfare.
It is important to note that while these parallels exist, the contexts and motivations behind the actions of IS and Russian forces are vastly different. This analysis serves to highlight the strategic similarities, not to equate the two parties or their ideologies. The future of Ukraine, like that of regions once controlled by IS, remains uncertain, but understanding these parallels may offer insight into potential strategies for peace and reconstruction.
- The opinion that Russian forces and the Islamic State (IS) share similar strategies in their conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, has gained traction among experts.
- Human rights groups have reported cases of civilian casualties and destruction caused by both Russian forces in Ukraine and IS in various countries, a stark indicator of similar tactics being employed.
- The focus on disrupting enemy supply networks and economic resources is a common strategic dimension in the wars of IS in Palestine and Syria, as well as Russian forces in the Middle East and Ukraine.
- News outlets are analyzing the General News of IS's use of urban terrorism tactics and infiltration operations, similar to Russian forces' operations in Ukraine, Crimea, and Donbas, under the Crime-and-Justice section.
- Experts are comparing the command and control approaches of both parties, with centralized but flexible leadership, as seen in the case of the IS's centralized leadership and Russia's centralized command in Syria and Ukraine.
- In the realm of Politics, parallels are being drawn between IS's use of terror tactics against civilians to spread fear and the alleged civilian casualties caused by Russian forces in Ukraine and Syria, aiming to demoralize the population and force submission.
- In the Sports section, the media is comparing the extreme brutality demonstrated by IS and Russian forces, including the documented cases of alleged executions of prisoners of war and identity-based executions, and discussing their use as tools of psychological warfare.
- While it is crucial to understand these parallels for strategic analysis and potential strategies for peace and reconstruction, it is essential to remember that the motivations and contexts behind the actions of IS and Russian forces are vastly different.
