Potential Repercussions of a Potential Re-emergence of Operation Opera: Implications for Iran's Nuclear Program and the Conundrum of Preemptive War
On June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force took a chunk out of Baghdad with their operation, Operation Opera – a bold airstrike targeted at Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. The Iraqis tried to spin it as mere scientific research, but Israel wasn't buying it – they felt the reactor was a secret weapon factory in disguise. With the imminent threat of a nuclear Iraq on their mind, they justified the attack as a self-defense move.
However, cleaning up the mess in Iraq wasn't enough to secure Israel's long-term goals. Most of the world wasn't pleased with Israel's move, labeling it an unnecessary and unjustified act of aggression. The US, among others, criticized Israel for causing disgusting political damages – breaking alliances and leaving Israel looking sketchy in the eyes of neutral states. Damn, talk about a PR nightmare.
But here's the kicker – the attack actually made Saddam Hussein crank up his nuclear program more than ever. By 1987, Iraq was over the moon (or perhaps more accurately, just one step away from nuclear meltdown) – they had begun the weaponization of fissile material for bomb production. If Saddam didn't create enough chaos to prompt an American-led coalition to attack Iraq again during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, he might have successfully kicked off an Iraqi nuclear arms race, just as Israel thought they'd thwarted with Operation Opera.
America's political scientist, Scott Silverstone, wasn't too happy about this turn of events. Using Operation Opera as a case study, he defined the so-called "preventive war paradox." Imagine compromising your security in the long term because of a successful but dodgy military action. Ain't that just a mind-boggling conundrum?
Silverstone explained that while successful preemptive attacks (where an attack is seen as a last resort against an imminent threat) have fewer political costs, preventive wars cost more. Attacking a state before it seriously threatens you might could make it want to get more deadly in response. And that's not all – other countries may question your trustworthiness and threat level, limiting your future alliances and security partnerships. Bloodthirsty moves, like Operation Opera back in '81, tend to stick to 'ya, yo.
These days, US B-2 stealth bombers are flaunting their stuff all over the place, and two carrier strike groups are cruising around in the Arabian Sea. Sounds like Iran might be in the crosshairs, baby. If you follow the um, "diplomacy of violence" theory, it seems like a combined American-Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program could be on the horizon. But hey, they're allegedly holding some indirect talks over Iran's nuclear program in Oman. Could this mean there's still room for discussion, or are they just bumpin' up against each other like wildcats?
So, what's the magic number for a nuclear program to get out of control? According to Silverstone (and Machiavelli, apparently), it's all about weighing the benefits against the costs. If Israel and its allies choose to attack Iran's nuclear program, they'll need to consider the consequences – will they gain more than they lose? That's the question they'll have to ask themselves, or live to regret it (like they did with Operation Opera, I guess).
Now, there might not be a magical tipping point for a nuclear program, but the preventive war paradox still looms large and nasty. Which brings us back to Israel and its allies – are they ready to choose a tipping point for a potential attack against Iran's nuclear program? It's a big decision, but it's gotta be done right, or else they'll just end up looking like a bunch of fools. Gotta find the balance between self-conscious rationality and strategic foresight, or the consequences will be dire. Kind of like an opera – the best ones don't always have a happy ending.
Disclaimer: Colonel Patrick Sullivan, PhD, is no political lightweight – he's the director of the West Point Academy's website. But remember, his views don't reflect the official stance of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. Still, the guy sure knows his stuff. Check out thatDan Hadani Collection picture of Menachem Begin, the Israeli PM after the Op if you don't believe me!
- The 'preventive war paradox' illustrated by Operation Opera in 1981 suggests that while preemptive attacks may have fewer political costs, preventive wars could lead to an escalation in adversaries' military capability and potentially limit future alliances and security partnerships.
- Israel and its allies, considering a potential attack on Iran's nuclear program, need to weigh the benefits against the costs, as the 'preventive war paradox' indicates that such an action might provoke Iran to become more militarized and undermine their international standing.
- As the US B-2 stealth bombers patrol the Arabian Sea and indirect talks about Iran's nuclear program take place in Oman, the question remains: Will Israel and its allies choose a tipping point for a preventive war against Iran's nuclear program, or will they prioritize diplomacy and find a way to maintain security without compromising their international standing?
