Nuclear disarmament agreements faltering?

Portal to a Perilous Nuclear Future: Navigating the Brink of the Nonproliferation Regime's Endurance

Nuclear disarmament agreements faltering?

By Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

For eight decades, the world has skirted the brink of nuclear catastrophe. Astonishingly, instead of plunging into Armageddon, we've witnessed an unexpected nuclear equilibrium, with scant countries utilising this devastating technology for weaponry. Kudos to a durable nonproliferation regime that's kept the Incredible Hulk of warfare reined in - so far. Now, though, geopolitical tremors are rattling the foundation of this regime, making us question its longevity.

In the swinging '60s, President Kennedy confidently predicted that around 25 countries would have nuclear weapons by the '70s. Fortunately, figures have shown that only nine nations possess these destructive tools, largely due to nations taking measures to prevent their neighbourhood from turning into a radioactive playground.

Enter the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a pact signed in 1968, acknowledging the nuclear exclusivity of the "Big Five" - the United States, Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom. While they promised not to expand their nuclear dominance, others were assured that they wouldn't be left out in the cold without weapons of mass destruction. For years, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been patrolling nations developing nuclear energy, ensuring that their missions are limited to civilian pursuits.

The US, under President Carter, placed a high priority on keeping the nuclear genie in the bottle in the '70s, facilitating the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). By pledging restraint in the export of enrichment and reprocessing technology, the member states of the NSG aimed to slow down the spread of nuclear capacities.

But now, the non-proliferation regime—a cornerstone of the world order—is being pushed to its limits as shifting political landscapes threaten its existence. Even IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi questions its future. One of the most visible challenges is Iran's quest for uranium enrichment beyond the 60% mark – well beyond what's necessary for civilian reactors. According to Grossi, an Iranian bomb is closer than most expect; months, not years. If Iran manages to pull off this feat, it's rumoured that Saudi Arabia would follow suit, withdrawing from the NPT.

The Middle Eastern region isn't the only one simmering with nuclear tensions. The global nonproliferation regime also faces a threat on the world stage. Germany and Japan refrained from pursuing nuclear weapons post World War II due to their alliance with the US, as the credibility of US deterrence offered the security they needed. However, under the current administration of President Donald Trump, US alliances are being weakened, weakening the US' extended deterrence in turn. This move has sparked doubts among foreign nations, prompting them to ponder whether they should embark on their own nuclear ventures. They're well aware that Ukraine, having given up Soviet-era nuclear weapons stationed on its soil, was later invaded by Russia, despite the country's guarantee of Ukrainian territorial integrity in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.

Certain analysts argue that we shouldn't worry, suggesting that nuclear weapons could stabilize regional power dynamics, as the Cold War legacy demonstrates. However, this bullish perspective assumes such political conditions: stable command-and-control systems, the absence of civil wars or destabilizing motivations, and restraint over the temptation to lob the first strike during a conflict's early stages.

Regrettably, these assumptions are unrealistic in many regions. Far from providing security, acquiring a nuclear capability often heightens vulnerability and insecurity in these parts of the world. Beyond local, tactical nuclear strikes breaching an 80-year global taboo, non-state actors pose a formidable threat. The low probability of a terrorist group stealing or buying nuclear materials from the black market still presents enormous challenges, as these rogue players can destabilize the global nuclear landscape.

The superpowers of today may not be completely immune to the consequences. Widespread or rapid proliferation could influence the global strategic balance and undermine the prospects of a peaceful, equitable world order. The question is: Can our global interests keep the nonproliferation regime intact? Realistically, an international regime doesn't need unanimous support to have a significant impact, but once erosion begins, it might be difficult to stem the tide.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a former dean of Harvard Kennedy School and former US assistant secretary of defense, stands as the author of the captivating memoir "A Life in the American Century."

The nuclear equilibrium, established through a durable nonproliferation regime, has kept the destructive power of nuclear weapons reined in for eight decades, despite President Kennedy's prediction in the '60s that 25 countries would possess these weapons by the '70s.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, was a pact that recognized the nuclear exclusivity of the "Big Five" while assuring other nations they wouldn't be left without weapons of mass destruction.
In the 1970s, the US, under President Carter, prioritized preventing the spread of nuclear capacities and facilitated the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Today, the non-proliferation regime faces challenges, particularly with Iran's uranium enrichment activities and the possibility of Saudi Arabia following suit if Iran successfully develops a nuclear bomb, potentially leading to widespread nuclear proliferation and undermining the prospects of a peaceful, equitable world order.