Lebanese Sunni Political Movement 2.0

In early September, a significant gathering took place at Parliamentarian Faisal Karami's summer residence in Bqaa Sifrin, bringing together figures from opposing ends of Lebanon's political spectrum. Among the attendees were Hassan Mrad, Adnan Traboulsi, Taha Naji, Fouad Makhzoumi, Ashraf Rifi, Abdel Rahman al-Bizri, Bilal Hasheimi, Ahmad Kheir, Abdel Aziz al-Samad, Waddah Sadeq, Mohammed Yahya, and Nouhad Machnouq.

The gathering reflected a shift in the Sunni community's political alignments, with a focus on advocating for a state monopoly on weapons and maintaining hostility towards Israel. Sheikh Abdel Latif Derian, the mufti of the republic, echoed these sentiments, emphasizing the importance of strengthening Lebanon internally and calling for a unifying approach that fortifies the nation in the face of crises.

Hassan Mrad, another political figure, made similar comments to those of Karami and Derian, declaring that the Lebanese government's decision to restrict weapons to the state is historic. This stance was also shared by the Future Movement figures, who have been vocal in their support for the government's decision.

The Jamaa al-Islamiyya, one of the targets of the state's disarmament process, was also in attendance, represented by Imad al-Hout. He met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun to present a proposal for a "national defense strategy." However, the Jamaa al-Islamiyya's military capacity is widely regarded as modest, and a clear message was conveyed to the group that it had to tread carefully regarding weapons, with consequences extending to the entire organization, not just its military wing.

Despite this, the Jamaa al-Islamiyya has been advocating for a national defense strategy since 2006, and their proposal for a national defense strategy implicitly agrees to deny Hezbollah weapons that it can use domestically. However, the upcoming parliamentary elections are expected to persist with these divisions, shaped by the continued absence of the Future Movement, the Jamaa's marginalization, and attempts to forge a coalition among the remaining forces, with Saudi Arabia acting, at least nominally, as the sponsor.

It is worth noting that the Sunni political group currently outside the coalition supported by Saudi Arabia is not explicitly named in the provided search results. By regional context, groups like Hezbollah’s allies and various opposition forces in Lebanon are distinct from Saudi-backed coalitions, and some Sunni groups aligned with these or independent factions could be outside Saudi patronage.

There has been growing talk of reviving a reform-oriented current within the Sunni community, but it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the Sunni community's broader alignment with Saudi Arabia. The Saudi strategy aims to draw Sunni politicians away from Hezbollah and integrate them into a coalition with the kingdom's own supporters.

In the recent municipal elections in Tripoli and Beirut, broad coalition lists and unity lists have faced opposition from Sunni electorates, indicating a continued resistance to the Saudi-backed coalition. Israeli strikes against the Jamaa al-Islamiyya during the conflict last year targeted individuals rather than centers, stockpiles, or tunnels, further highlighting the group's limited military capacity.

Ten Jamaa members have remained imprisoned for more than two months on charges of possessing weapons and ammunition, despite the Lebanese army's announcement that their case was not terrorism-related. This situation underscores the ongoing tension between the government and the Jamaa al-Islamiyya, with the Sunni political landscape reconstituting itself along relatively clear lines, with the Jamaa al-Islamiyya remaining isolated and potentially exposed to existential risks.