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Infiltrate, Destroy, and Leverage: Israel's Rebuttal at the Suez Canal, 1973

U.S. Army Transforming Strategy with Multidomain Operations (MDO), Aiming to Counter Both State and Non-State Threats. General C.Q. Brown, Jr., Joint Chiefs Chairman, advocates this shift to bolster the service's competitiveness against various adversaries.

Military Action at the Suez Canal, 1973: Israel's Counterattack, Disabling, Dispersing, and...
Military Action at the Suez Canal, 1973: Israel's Counterattack, Disabling, Dispersing, and Capitalizing

Infiltrate, Destroy, and Leverage: Israel's Rebuttal at the Suez Canal, 1973

Modernizing Warfare: A Tale of Multidomain Operations

Let's talk about the US Army's new approach to handling a diverse range of adversaries – Multidomain Operations (MDO). This fresh operational concept, advocated by none other than General C.Q. Brown, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, aims to keep the focus on what truly matters: working harmoniously across all domains (land, air, sea, space, and cyber) and Services, the Total Force.

In today's world, battlefields are becoming increasingly lethal and challenging operational maneuver and formation endurance. The MDO concept, now part of the Army's capstone doctrine with corresponding changes in force structure, is here to address these challenges, preparing us not just for today's battles but for the wars of tomorrow.

Traditional large-scale combat poses significant challenges. With the rise of adversaries around the globe and the possibility of a war of expanded scale and intensity, the Army needs to find the perfect balance between retaining counterinsurgency competencies learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and gearing up for expeditions against adversaries that match and even surpass our own capabilities.

Recent large-scale combat, as seen in the Battle of Mosul, Nagorno-Karabakh War, and Russia-Ukraine War, suggests that modern warfare still remains positional and attritional. The potential for employing dynamic power projection to achieve decisive outcomes through offensive fire and maneuver remains a high-risk, but potentially necessary, option.

The original MDO concept, emphasizing "convergence" across joint, interagency, and multinational teams, may require expeditionary ground forces, combining traditional practices and emerging technologies, to penetrate, dis-integrate, and exploit increasingly sophisticated adversary defenses in places like Eastern Europe and the South China Sea.

However, the expedition into fiercely contested spaces should be approached with caution and humility, lest we stumble into a catastrophe. Nevertheless, it's essential to study successful large-scale maneuver operations to maximize readiness, should we be called upon to lend our services.

History is filled with examples of armies that executed this kind of offensive action effectively. Among these is Napoleon Bonaparte's masterpiece at Austerlitz in 1805 and the German invasion of France in 1940. But it's the Israeli counteroffensive in the second week of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War that offers a particularly relevant case study – a campaign that featured mechanized penetration, contested river crossings, disintegration of air defense networks, reduction of antiarmor systems, and deep exploitation in rear areas.

This brutal, yet informative, campaign provided a blood-soaked proving ground for new technologies and creative tactics, as both Arab and Israeli forces adapted to the harsh reality of a more destructive environment. The 1973 conflict, with its cross-domain innovations, contested maneuver, and devastating losses, invites reconsideration by the US Army. Studying this war through today's operational environment will yield invaluable insights into dealing with new capabilities, like precision strike, unmanned platforms, electronic warfare, and informational innovations – all while addressing age-old challenges posed by massed artillery, constrained logistics, and restrictive terrain.

Remember, the US Army may be required to unleash high-tempo offensives while avoiding attrition and culmination – a task demanding the highest operational art in expeditionary settings and unprecedented cooperation across arms, services, and agencies to mitigate risk and, despite countervailing trends in modern warfare, achieve decisive outcomes under challenging circumstances.

Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Jennings is an Army strategist and associate professor in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Jennings has a background as a 19D cavalry scout and armor officer, having served as a platoon leader and troop commander in Operation Iraqi Freedom and as a strategic planner for the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Prior to his current role, Jennings taught history at the US Military Academy at West Point and in the Department of Military History at CGSC. He is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies (Advanced Military Studies Program) and earned a PhD in history from the University of Kent.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit

MDO, as a comprehensive operational concept, integrates multi-domain capabilities and modern command and control to prepare the US Army to fight and win in future conflict environments marked by complexity, speed, and technological sophistication. By operating seamlessly across domains and presenting adversaries with multiple challenges simultaneously, the US Army aims to keep its dominance against peer and near-peer competitors, exploiting the synergistic effects of cross-domain operations.

  1. The US Army's new approach to warfare, Multidomain Operations (MDO), is aimed at achieving dominance against peer and near-peer competitors, leveraging modern command and control and multi-domain capabilities in complex, fast-paced, and technologically advanced conflict environments.
  2. In military history, the Israeli counteroffensive in the second week of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, characterized by mechanized penetration, contested river crossings, disintegration of air defense networks, reduction of antiarmor systems, and deep exploitation in rear areas, offers a relevant case study for the US Army in dealing with new capabilities like precision strike, unmanned platforms, electronic warfare, and informational innovations.
  3. The US Army's MDO strategy emphasizes convergence across joint, interagency, and multinational teams to expeditionary ground forces, combining traditional practices and emerging technologies, and is essential for penetrating, dis-integrating, and exploiting increasingly sophisticated adversary defenses in places like Eastern Europe and the South China Sea.
  4. The MDO concept is critical in preventing attrition and culmination while unleashing high-tempo offensives, necessitating the highest operational art in expeditionary settings and unprecedented cooperation across arms, services, and agencies to mitigate risk and achieve decisive outcomes under challenging circumstances.

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