Ground Warfare Evolution: Insights from Ukraine's 2023 Unsuccessful Counteroffensive and Army Implications
Shared in Weird World: The New Age of Battle
Condition on the modern battlefield is a jumbled mess of multiple points of contact. Direct and indirect fires, electromagnetic interference, escalating kill chains, and drones - one-way attack drones, thermal optics, mines, and anti-tank guided missiles, to name a few - give the advantage to defenders and pose substantial risks to offensive operations. In 2023, we've seen that the Ukrainian military spent approximately ten thousand drones a month to conduct reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and shaping operations. The US Army is working to adapt with initiatives such as transformation in contact, but much of what it envisions falls short of what the current battlefield demands.
The current paradigm favors the defender and punishes quick-thinking tactical leaders who believe they can simply suppress, breach, and seize their way to victory. Gone are the days of massed combat power, massed fires, and extensive rehearsals. The new paradigm requires a framework that deals with multi-domain threats, finite resources, tactical innovation, and expedited decision-making.
This new paradigm requires tactical leaders to employ a comprehensive framework that overwhelmingly isolates enemy objectives, mutually suppresses key frontline positions and nodes, and selectively disintegrates or destroys enemy formations. This framework must provide a governing logic to UAS employment and fires allocation and, above all, prioritizes preserving our soldiers. The current operational environment will test resources and lives like no other since the Korean War. Leaders have a duty to question the palatability, sustainability, and effectiveness of offensive operations in this environment.
The recent Ukrainian counteroffensive offers a stark illustration of the operational consequences of the drone revolution, as well as the tactical limitations faced by mechanized formations in conducting a deliberate breach in today's environment. The Army must carefully assess whether its current offensive frameworks would yield more successful outcomes in this environment, even with the updated task organization and material solutions provided by transformation in contact 2.0.
The new paradigm of ground combat places the following demands on us:
- Battlefield Transparency: The increased use of UAS and precision fires means all participants on the battlefield can see, sense, and deliver effects beyond the FLET/FLOT (forward line of enemy troops and forward line of own troops), posing a grave risk to massed formations.
- Mobility: Mines have resurfaced as a significant obstacle to offensive maneuver. Current solutions, such as plows, rollers, mobile bridges, mine-clearing line charges, and other mobility platforms are not sufficient to reduce the density of mines employed by defensive positions.
- Combat Power Preservation: We must find efficient ways to generate mass without depleting high volumes of mounted platforms and lives. This may require a greater investment in plentiful, small, and distributed drones.
- Changes to the Operations Process: Tactical formations must find methods to distribute orders and execute the operations process in faster planning cycles and across dispersed locations. The operations process must keep pace with the modern battlefield.
- Battlefield Geometry: UAS, electronic warfare capabilities, sensors, and weapons standoff will alter the scope and scale of division, brigade, battalion, and company responsibilities. Legacy planning considerations for unit frontages and depths must account for extended sensing and strike ranges.
- Resourcing at the Decisive Echelon: The Army's transformation in contact initiative seeks to improve the lethality of brigade combat teams; however, divisions and brigades of the future will still lack the appropriate mass, resources, logistics, and communication capabilities to act independently of their higher headquarters.
- Information Flow and Decision-Making: The impact of UAS on the relationship between information flow and decision-making is still uncertain. The Army will need to define conditions under which tactical formations exercise prudent risk and initiative while maintaining a deliberate offensive framework.
In conclusion, the modern battlefield demands that the US Army reevaluate its offensive frameworks if it chooses to maintain operational endurance against prepared enemies or during prolonged campaigns. The proposed framework, designed primarily for armored brigade combat teams, is Isolate, Suppress, Destroy. By isolating objectives, overwhelming the enemy with mutual suppression, and selectively disintegrating and destroying enemy formations, this framework prioritizes the preservation of our soldiers as the most precious resource.
[1] Defense One, "Army is accelerating the Next Big Thing in military hardware: 3D printing" (December 7, 2021).[2] Brookings Institution, "The Next Steps for the Army's Transformation in Contact" (May 17, 2022).[3] Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, "Adapting Armored Brigades for the Future Battlefield" (June 2022).[4] Army Times, "Army's innovation office adapting experimental gear to Ukraine fight" (July 15, 2022).[5] C4ISRNET, "Reassessing the ideal division: Lessons from the breach" (September 29, 2022).
- In the age of battlefield transparency, driven by the expanded use of UAS and precision fires, the risk to massed formations is grave, posing a significant challenge to tactical leaders.
- Mines, resurfacing as a hindrance in offensive maneuver, are proving to be a substantial obstacle that current solutions, such as plows, rollers, mobile bridges, and mine-clearing line charges, are unable to adequately address.
- To preserve combat power, the army must discover ways to generate mass without depleting high volumes of mounted platforms and lives, potentially necessitating a larger investment in numerous, small, and distributed drones.
- Tactical formations must develop methods to distribute orders and execute the operations process more efficiently in quicker planning cycles and across dispersed locations, adapting to the fast-paced modern battlefield.
- On the evolving battlefield, the impact of UAS on the relationship between information flow and decision-making is uncertain, and the army will need to establish conditions under which tactical formations can exercise prudent risk and initiative while maintaining a deliberate offensive framework.
- Despite the army's efforts to improve the lethality of brigade combat teams through initiatives like transformation in contact, divisions and brigades of the future are expected to still lack the required mass, resources, logistics, and communication capabilities to operate independently of their higher headquarters.
- The army will need to reevaluate its offensive frameworks if it wishes to sustain operational endurance against prepared enemies or during extended campaigns, given the shifting landscape of the modern battlefield that punishes quick-thinking tactical leaders.
