Federal Court dismissed lawsuit filed by a former soldier pertaining to Covid-19 vaccination
The Federal Court of Canada has ruled against a former Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) member, Liam Jarbeau, in his claim of constructive dismissal and breaches of his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The court found that Jarbeau's claim lacked legal merit and fell outside its jurisdiction.
Jarbeau, who served in the CAF for eight years until March 2024, sued the Attorney General of Canada in March 2025. He argued that his military service was an integral part of his identity and that losing it would constitute significant harm to his character and sense of self. He also claimed that the military's COVID-19 vaccine mandate violated his freedom of conscience and religion, life, liberty, and security of the person, and equality rights under the Charter.
However, the court found that Jarbeau's claim did not meet the threshold of serious state-imposed psychological harm under section 7. Moreover, the court stated that as a CAF member, Jarbeau knew he could be posted to different locations and given different assignments, and this did not engage the security interests protected by section 7.
Regarding the Charter claims, the court found that Jarbeau's pleading for the section 15(1) equality rights claim did not explain how Jarbeau's treatment related to any protected ground. The court also struck out the Charter claims under sections 2(a) for freedom of conscience and religion, 7 for life, liberty, and security of the person, and 15(1) for equality rights.
In addition, the court held that even if the claims were properly pleaded, it would have declined jurisdiction due to the CAF's internal grievance process, which Jarbeau had availed himself of but not completed. The court found that Liam Jarbeau's claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and fell outside the court's jurisdiction.
The court's ruling is consistent with established jurisprudence. In its decision, the court cited the case Gallant v The Queen [1978], which states that CAF members serve "at pleasure" and cannot invoke civil remedies for constructive dismissal. The court also referred to Moodie v Canada (National Defence) [2010] and Qualizza v Canada [2024] in its decision to defer to the CAF's internal process.
The court's ruling also reflects the principle that challenges to military policies, including vaccine mandates, must generally be addressed through internal military legal channels before federal courts will intervene, especially when claims involve complex balances of public interest, military discipline, and individual rights.
No order for costs was made, with each party bearing their own costs.
Table of Legal Reasoning and Court's Position
| Aspect | Legal Reasoning and Court's Position | |-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Constructive dismissal claim | Rejected because CAF members are not bound by normal employer contracts; no evidence CAF fundamentally altered terms to compel resignation[1]. | | Charter breaches claim | Claims of spiritual discrimination and Charter violations were not supported legally; the vaccine mandate was a lawful military policy[1].| | Exhaustion of grievance process | Plaintiff left before completing military grievance procedures, limiting court’s ability to intervene[1]. | | Court’s jurisdiction | Federal Court defers to military grievance procedures and military law; lacks jurisdiction for employment claims not exhausted administratively[1].|
[1] Federal Court of Canada decision in the case of Liam Jarbeau v Attorney General of Canada.
Politics surrounding the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) mandate for COVID-19 vaccines, as well as general news about policy-and-legislation, have been highlighted through the legal case of Liam Jarbeau, a former CAF member. Jarbeau's claim of constructive dismissal and Charter breaches was dismissed by the Federal Court of Canada, as the court found his claims to lack legal merit and fell outside its jurisdiction. This ruling reflects the principle that challenges to military policies must generally be addressed through internal military legal channels before federal courts will intervene, especially when claims involve complex balances of public interest, military discipline, and individual rights.
