Exploring the Appeal of Secret Operations: Understanding Psychological Aspects and the Future Prospects of Unconventional Warfare
In the intricate world of international politics, the choice between covert action and overt intervention is a critical one for policymakers. A new study by Michael Poznansky, an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College, sheds light on this decision-making process, using the mid-1950s as a case study.
During this period, the Syrian regime was relatively hostile towards the United States, favouring closer relations with the Soviet Union and Egypt. In contrast, the Lebanese regime was extremely friendly to the United States, with President Camille Chamoun among the first to embrace the Eisenhower Doctrine.
When Lebanon descended into civil war in 1958, with Christians and Muslims on opposing sides, Eisenhower chose to intervene openly to save the pro-US government, despite the risks of widespread anti-American sentiment and harm to the country's reputation. This decision was driven by the desire to limit losses and preserve the status quo, according to the psychological theory of intervention.
However, in the case of Syria, American policymakers opted for secret attempts to foment unrest to bring down the regime. But these efforts were unsuccessful, highlighting the unpredictable nature of covert operations.
The study also reveals that the risk tolerance of leaders during interventions varies according to the objective they are pursuing. In the case of foreign-imposed regime change, leaders are confronted with a net gain if it succeeds, while in regime rescue, leaders are trying to prevent a loss. This concept of loss aversion explains why leaders might be more likely to choose covert action when undertaking regime change and stick with it even when it appears to be failing, and why they might be more willing to pursue overt intervention, despite high risks, during regime rescue.
The mid-1950s also saw notable exceptions where leaders embarked on risky overt interventions (Vietnam) and sought to head off a burgeoning insurgency discreetly before deploying troops (Afghanistan).
In today's world, the study's findings remain relevant. The 2020 Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy points out that China, Russia, and Iran are willing practitioners of covert operations and campaigns of disinformation, deception, and sabotage. Understanding the conditions under which America's chief rivals are most likely to use covert action or abandon it can help policymakers anticipate potential outcomes more accurately.
However, it's important to note that meddling in foreign countries, especially overt interventions, can lead to nationalism, damage a country's international reputation, and potentially escalate unwanted and disastrous situations. The study serves as a reminder of the delicate balance policymakers must maintain between asserting influence and preserving peace.
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