Covert Operations' Attraction: Psychology and the Evolution of Irregular Combat Strategy
In the tumultuous year of 1958, the United States found itself deeply involved in the Middle East, deploying approximately fourteen thousand troops to Lebanon in a bid to save the Lebanese president, Camille Chamoun. This intervention was a strategic move amidst the Cold War landscape, where the US and Soviet Union frequently engaged in covert operations to advance their interests.
Lebanon, strategically located and of economic interest to the US, was descending into civil war, with Christians and Muslims on opposing sides. The American decision to intervene was driven by economic interests, including Syria's capacity to affect regional oil flows, and fears that Syria would become a bastion of communism.
However, policymakers understood the potential risks. Overt intervention in Lebanon could generate widespread anti-American sentiment in the region, harm the country's reputation, delegitimize Chamoun, and more. The erosion of legitimacy of a supported government can occur due to a foreign actor's presence in another country.
In contrast, policymakers feared that overtly interfering in Syria would damage the United States’ reputation because it would violate the nonintervention principle of the UN Charter. Meddling in foreign countries overtly can lead to nationalism, damage a country's international reputation, and potentially escalate into unwanted and disastrous situations.
Covert action, on the other hand, is usually less risky because it may shield leaders from fallout if it fails. If successful, covert operations can achieve regime change or rescue without 'dirtying their hands' publicly, providing plausible deniability.
The theory behind this approach suggests that leaders' tolerance for risk depends on their objectives. They have a higher risk tolerance when preventing the status quo from deteriorating (regime rescue), and a lower risk tolerance when actively improving the status quo (regime change). This theory, based on the concept of loss aversion, where people are more willing to take risks to prevent losses than to secure gains, was recently published in the journal Security Studies.
In the case of foreign-imposed regime change, this represents a net gain for states if it succeeds. In the case of regime rescue, leaders are confronted with the prospect of protecting the status quo by preventing a friendly regime from falling, which is meant to forestall a loss.
This dynamic was evident in the mid-1950s, when the Syrian regime was relatively hostile towards the United States, with closer relations with the Soviet Union and Egypt. Meanwhile, the Lebanese regime in the years leading up to US intervention was extremely friendly to the United States.
The psychological theory of intervention further supports this dynamic. Policymakers were willing to take the gamble of intervening openly in Lebanon because they were trying to limit their losses and preserve the status quo, while in Syria they were trying to strengthen their position and improve the status quo.
In conclusion, the Eisenhower Administration's intervention in Lebanon serves as a compelling case study in the strategic use of covert action and the psychological dynamics that drive leaders' decisions in foreign intervention. It underscores the delicate balance between advancing interests, maintaining reputation, and managing risk in international politics.
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