Contest for Harmonious Asia Coexistence through Military Simulation

Contest for Harmonious Asia Coexistence through Military Simulation

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, a long-standing territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea, has been the focus of ongoing strategic analysis and policy debates. While specific accounts of congressional peace games focused on this issue are not publicly available, insights from broader strategic analysis offer a glimpse into the dynamics that such simulations would likely explore.

### Broader Strategic Context

The U.S. and China are engaged in an escalating strategic competition over the Indo-Pacific region. Current U.S. military strategies and operational concepts are viewed as insufficient to address the risk of mission failure and unacceptable attrition in potential contingencies involving China. Deterrence by denial, preventing China from achieving its objectives, is recommended as a core strategic approach, given that China may be willing to absorb significant costs to achieve its goals.

Coalition warfare and close coordination with allies and partners are seen as essential to countering Chinese coercion or aggression, forcing China to be the aggressor or escalator in any scenario. The interconnected nature of Eurasian threats means that crises like the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute cannot be viewed in isolation; actions and alliances in Europe, for example, regarding Ukraine, have ripple effects in Asia, complicating any "division of labor" strategy that separates U.S. focus between regions.

### Implications for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

The risk of escalation through grey-zone tactics is a particular concern in the East China Sea. U.S. responses must be calibrated to avoid provoking unwanted escalation while still defending interests. The effectiveness of any U.S. response depends on clear roles for allies (notably Japan) and a unified approach to signaling resolve and restraint. The U.S. must ensure that its strategy is understood by Beijing as focused on denial, not punishment, to reduce the risk of miscalculation. Developments in other theaters, such as Ukraine, influence perceptions of U.S. resolve and can either embolden or deter Chinese actions in the East China Sea.

### Potential Simulation Outcomes

Based on these themes, it is reasonable to infer that recent or hypothetical congressional peace games would likely highlight the difficulty of balancing deterrence and restraint, the central role of alliances, the limitations of military solutions alone, and the challenge of sustaining domestic and international support for a long-term strategy of engagement and deterrence in the face of potential crises.

### Conclusion

Recent expert analyses and policy debates suggest that managing the Sino-US security dilemma, particularly regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, requires a nuanced, alliance-centered strategy focused on deterrence by denial, calibrated responses to grey-zone tactics, and recognition of the global interconnectedness of security challenges. Effective simulations would likely stress the need for clear communication, coalition resilience, and integration of all instruments of national power to avoid unintended escalation and sustain a favorable balance in the East China Sea.

It is worth noting that members of Congress believe that Japan's ongoing military modernization further complicates U.S. policy in the East China Sea. The United States identifies China as its "pacing" threat, aligning its policies, strategies, and military modernization to deter China. The United States has reassured Japan that mutual defense under the U.S.-Japan defense treaty covers Japan's claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Despite concerns from some in Washington and the Pentagon, members of Congress do not believe a Sino-US war is inevitable regarding the studied flashpoint. The political status of Taiwan is a stark reminder for Chinese leaders of what they describe as the century of humiliation (1839-1949), during which China lost control over large areas of its territory. The costs of a Sino-US war would be high for both countries, according to analysts.

Future peace games should incorporate representatives across U.S. agencies, especially the Departments of State and Defense, as well as senior U.S. military leaders deployed to the region. Public opinion in both the United States and China can moderate countries' policies. Americans are less likely to support military force against China unless it is clearly linked to a vital national security interest. Chinese leaders' strident statements about U.S. regional policy are due to insecurity over the costs they may incur from their citizens for not exercising greater regional and global leadership.

1. The escalating strategic competition between the U.S. and China over the Indo-Pacific region requires a strategic approach centered on deterrence by denial to prevent China from achieving its objectives.
2. Coalition warfare and close coordination with allies, such as Japan, are essential in countering Chinese coercion or aggression in potential war-and-conflicts like the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.
3. The U.S. must ensure its strategy is understood by China as focused on denial, not punishment, to reduce the risk of miscalculation in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, given the interconnected nature of Eurasian threats.
4. Policy debates suggest that managing the Sino-US security dilemma, particularly regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, requires effective communication, coalition resilience, and integration of all instruments of national power to avoid unintended escalation.
5. Future peace games should include representatives from various U.S. agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense, and senior U.S. military leaders deployed to the region, recognizing the importance of public opinion in moderating policies and strategies in the context of national security and politics.

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