Clash at Novodarivka II: The Test of Multidisciplinary Forces on the Future Battlefield
In a recent exercise at the National Training Center, the US Army's armored battalion, known as the Blackhorse, attempted to seize the city of Razish, a task assigned to a donovian mechanized infantry battalion tasked with its defense (The US Army's armored battalion...). This simulated conflict sheds light on the current debate surrounding the effectiveness and cost of armored formations in modern warfare, a topic that continues to draw attention as the Army pursues its modernization strategy.
Successful breakthroughs often result in easily recoverable and repairable equipment (Equipment can be easily recovered...). However, when a penetration fails or gains limited ground, rapid repair and regeneration of military forces become extremely challenging due to tactical reconnaissance-strike regimes (In a failed penetration...). This pattern has been observed in the ongoing war in Ukraine, where military formations have faced significant difficulties and high losses.
Despite common perception, the degree to which precision-strike complexes are tied to the use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) is not straightforward. It appears to be heavily dependent on the belligerent UAS magazine depth, investment in capabilities to penetrate opposing counter-UAS networks, the static and attritional nature of the front, and ongoing artillery and artillery ammunition shortages (Despite common perception...).
Armored forces may take high losses in a prepared adversarial defense during a breakthrough attempt, but these losses are typically greater in terms of equipment rather than casualties (Armored forces may take high losses...). Each of the brigade's nine rifle companies dismount 108 riflemen, offering a severe dismounted infantry overmatch against infantry-short Russian tank-heavy battalion tactical groups, tank regiments, and combined arms brigades (Each of the brigade's nine rifle companies...).
When faced with heavy military losses, commanders will call for the infantry, but infantry within military-heavy units are primarily designed to operate in concert with military and not in independent or leading roles (When faced with heavy military losses...). To mitigate the problems associated with armored formations, a mobile infantry or Stryker brigade combat team, supported by some mobile protected firepower, could be a more effective solution.
When armor is unable to exploit its shock, firepower, and mobility en masse due to severely restricted terrain, the difficulty of the defense, or lack of support, a different approach is required. Lead with infantry, reconnaissance, or unmanned systems supported by small tank formations to set conditions before unleashing a trailing armored horde (When armor is unable...).
Recent and continuing up-gunning of Stryker and mobile infantry brigade combat team antitank capabilities (Recent and continuing up-gunning...) suggests that the Army is aware of these challenges and is taking steps to address them. However, the historical pattern of high losses and costs associated with armored formations must be approached with caution.
The chief causal factor of tank loss has been both highly variable throughout history and inclining to greater democratization across the modern combined arms team (The chief causal factor of tank loss...). The M10 Booker's cancellation is an example of the controversy surrounding sending Americans into harm's way in less than fully protective vehicles (The M10 Booker's cancellation...).
The regularity with which dismounted infantry are able to disappear within existing or rapidly created restricted terrain makes them extremely hard to dislodge (The regularity with which...). As the Army continues its modernization efforts, understanding the role of armored formations, the importance of dismounted infantry, and the evolving nature of precision-strike complexes will be crucial in shaping effective military strategies.
