China's Visit by Leader Ma; DPP's Overlooked Blind Spot

In the midst of Ma Ying-jeou's fourth trip to China post-office, Taiwan is trapped in the familiar dance of political theater. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has slammed Ma's participation in the Straits Forum as a dance with Beijing, while the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) defends it as constitutional diplomacy.

Here's the agonizing truth Taiwan overlooks: the real issue isn't if Ma's visit benefits or harms Taiwan; it's why the island republic lacks a sophisticated, multi-track strategy for one of the world's most intricate geopolitical relationships.

The contention narrows Taiwan's cross-strait options to a false binary: you're either "pro-unification" or "pro-independence;" either you engage with Beijing or you don't. This overly simplistic approach hurts Taiwan's sophisticated democracy and the public's nuanced views on cross-strait relations.

Ma's visit — no matter the political leanings — illustrates something Taiwan's leadership struggles to provide: sustained, high-level engagement with Beijing that doesn't necessitate official government endorsement. In diplomatic circles, this is known as "track II diplomacy" — informal channels that can maintain dialogue when official ones are frozen.

The DPP's instinctive criticism of Ma's visit reflects a strategic blind spot. By treating any engagement with Beijing as inherently treacherous, Taiwan's ruling party has effectively surrendered the entire diplomatic arena to the opposition.

This isn't just politically near-sighted; it's strategically hazardous.

Consider what Ma's presence at the Straits Forum achieves, beyond the symbolism:

It preserves Taiwan's voice in cross-strait discussions at a time when official communication channels remain largely shut.
It offers Beijing a credible Taiwanese interlocutor who articulates Taiwan's democratic values and political constraints, which Beijing desperately needs to comprehend.
It ensures continued access for Taiwan's business community and civil society to China's networks driving economic and cultural exchanges.

Critics are right to be wary of Beijing's "united front" tactics. The Chinese Communist Party uses events like the Straits Forum to legitimize its claims over Taiwan and sow discord within Taiwanese society. But the solution isn't to disengage. It's to engage more strategically.

Rather than outright condemning Ma's visit, the DPP should be raising tougher questions: How can Taiwan utilize multiple channels of engagement to advance its interests? How can informal dialogue complement rather than undermine official policy? How can dialogue be maintained without compromising Taiwan's interests?

The Mainland Affairs Council's response — expressing "deep regret" and warning about propaganda — reads like something from an authoritarian government trembling at unauthorized contact with the enemy. That isn't how confident democracies behave.

Countries like Israel, South Korea, and Japan maintain unofficial channels with adversaries via academic institutions, business networks, and former officials, as do numerous other democratic nations facing complex security challenges.

One key component of Ma's visit that deserves attention is his emphasis on youth exchanges. Whatever one thinks of Ma's politics, sending young Taiwanese to China benefits Taiwan in the long term.

Young Taiwanese would return with insider knowledge of Chinese society, its economy, and governance, helping them navigate cross-strait relations more effectively in their careers. They'd also develop a sophisticated understanding of Taiwan's challenges, making the nation less vulnerable to miscalculation and misunderstanding. In an era where Beijing increasingly shapes global narratives about Taiwan, having informed Taiwanese voices to engage with Chinese counterparts is an advantage, not a liability.

Taiwan's political leaders need to stop viewing cross-strait engagement as a zero-sum game where any contact with Beijing automatically benefits Chinese interests. This mindset misconstrues how modern diplomacy operates in intricate, interdependent relationships.

Consider Taiwan's relationship with Japan, which involves extensive unofficial exchanges despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations. Former Japanese officials frequently visit Taiwan and maintain ongoing dialogues with their Taiwanese counterparts. These exchanges don't compromise Japan's commitment to its "one China" policy; they enhance mutual understanding and strengthen the relationship within existing constraints.

Taiwan could develop a similar framework for cross-strait engagement — one that acknowledges the so-called "1992 consensus," while preserving strategic ambiguity about its applicability. This would allow for ongoing dialogue without either side surrendering their core positions.

Academic and think tank exchanges could maintain dialogue on cross-strait issues through universities and research institutions, providing a platform for candid discussions of sensitive topics without needing government endorsement. Intellectual forums offer the opportunity to explore complex policy questions that official channels often can't accommodate.

Business and economic forums should continue facilitating commercial dialogue that benefits both sides while carefully avoiding political complications that could jeopardize vital economic relationships. Taiwan's economic prosperity remains deeply intertwined with China, and maintaining these commercial channels serves practical and strategic purposes even during periods of political tension.

Cultural and social exchanges are another vital dimension, promoting connections between people that build understanding and lower the risk of conflict, particularly among younger generations who would inherit the cross-strait relationship.

Lastly, utilizing retired leaders and diplomats to maintain high-level communication channels, as Ma is doing, provides a valuable safety valve for managing tensions while preserving official positions on both sides.

Ma's China visit is neither advantageous nor detrimental in isolation; its value depends on how Taiwan's broader political leadership contextualizes and capitalizes on it.

If it remains an isolated initiative by an opposition figure, it would indeed serve Beijing's interests more than Taiwan's.

However, if it's integrated into a coordinated, multi-track approach to engagement, it could significantly serve Taiwan's interests.

Taiwan's survival and prosperity rely not on ideological purity but on strategic flexibility and diplomatic ingenuity. Ma's visit should be the starting point of that conversation, not its conclusion.

Y. Tony Yang is an endowed professor and associate dean at George Washington University. He earned his law degree from National Taiwan University and his doctoral degree from Harvard University.

Additional Insights:

Taiwan's Strategic Ambiguity: Taiwan can maintain a policy of strategic ambiguity, signaling its willingness to engage but not committing to either unification or independence. This allows it to navigate complex geopolitical dynamics while preserving its autonomy.
China's United Front Work Department: The United Front Work Department is the Chinese Communist Party's department responsible for cultivating relationships with pro-China entities and striving to influence foreign governments and societies. Engaging with Beijing through unofficial channels can help Taiwan better understand its tactics and adapt its strategy accordingly.
Potential Risks: Engaging with Beijing through unofficial channels carries potential risks, such as being used to sow discord within Taiwanese society, infiltrating sensitive information, and legitimizing China's claims over Taiwan. Taiwan must be careful to navigate these risks while capitalizing on the opportunities that multi-track diplomacy presents.

Taiwan's political leaders should consider implementing a sophisticated, multi-track strategy in policy-and-legislation regarding cross-strait relations, rather than treating any engagement with Beijing as inherently treacherous, as demonstrated by the DPP's criticism of Ma's visit to China.
In the realm of general-news, there is a need for Taiwan to engage more strategically with China, including utilizing informal channels like track II diplomacy, in order to preserve Taiwan's voice in cross-strait discussions, offer a credible Taiwanese interlocutor to articulate Taiwan's democratic values, and ensure continued access for Taiwan's business community and civil society to China's networks.