Destroying Moscow's Victory Parade with Drones: A Dangerous Escalation
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) in Moscow: Clarifying the perceived advantage for Putin if an attack were to occur - Airstrikes in Moscow: Understanding how such an incident could solidify Putin's power
By Gernot Kramper
- 4 Min Read
In the recent discussions, the possibility of a Ukrainian drone attack on the Victory Day Parade in Moscow has been brought up. Is this a feasible scenario?
Ukraine has access to long-range drones, such as the UJ-22 Airborne, and modified homemade drones that can reach up to 1000 kilometers. With the support of Western technology, Ukraine has considerably improved its drone production capabilities, making an attack on the Kremlin a technical possibility. The parade's route and date are known, making it an accessible target.
Such an attack would directly impact the Kremlin ruler's ego and prestige, showcasing Kyiv's remaining capabilities despite the current situation. It would build upon previous Ukrainian drone attacks, like those on Belgorod or Rostov-on-Don, which demonstrated Kyiv's potential to wage large-scale war. The impact would be more extensive than regular attacks on ammunition depots or oil refineries, whose public relations effect has diminished. While such operations have been successful for Ukraine, they have had little significant impact on the ground war, for instance, in the contested region of Donetsk or in Ukrainian fights in the Russian Oblast Kursk.
A Precarious Operation
However, executing an operation in the heart of Moscow would be highly challenging. The attack would not catch the Russians off guard. They know the target and the time frame, and they would undoubtedly bolster security for the parade and the Kremlin. Surrounding Moscow are advanced air defense systems like S-400 and Pantsir-S1, which have been reinforced following recent drone attacks, such as on May 5, 2025. Hitting any target in the sprawling city of Moscow is a different challenge than successfully reaching the limited, central space of the parade. In a mass attack on January 15, 2025, Kyiv used around 200 long-range drones, targeting various locations in Russia, often launched from areas like Sumy or the Ukrainian-controlled region of Kursk, about 450 to 600 kilometers from Moscow. This number could potentially be increased, concentrating all drones on a single target.
To disrupt the celebration, the drones wouldn't even have to reach their target in large numbers. The approach of a drone swarm alone would likely trigger an air alert, potentially causing the event to be canceled.
Thus, the question of whether Kyiv could disrupt the prestigious event is answered with a clear "Yes". The next question is what military options Putin would then have. Almost simultaneously, a similar event would be happening in Kyiv, which is equally vulnerable. Russia's options are much more extensive than Kyiv's. Putin is not limited to slow drones to attack Kyiv, and it is only about 150 kilometers from Russian-controlled territory, such as the region of Chernihiv or Belarus.
Devastating Counterstrikes
The Kremlin could attack the Ukrainian capital with far faster and more effective weapons. Its arsenal includes air-launched hypersonic missiles of the "Kinshal" type, ballistic missiles of the "Iskander" type, and possibly the novel "Oreschnik" missile, which has only been used once. These weapons are far more valuable, and Russia typically does not use them in mass attacks. However, Putin could resort to his reserves for a retaliatory strike.
In the past, during intense attacks on Kyiv in 2022, the Ukrainian air defense could only intercept ballistic missiles in exceptional cases. Given the current weakened air defense, exhausted by continuous Russian attacks, individual aircraft could be shot down, but in large numbers, Russia's missiles would hit their targets. Apart from the swift strike using valuable missiles, Kyiv could subsequently be attacked by drones. These could have a longer flight time but could be launched from much closer range, such as from Russian bases in Belarus. The result: While Ukraine could achieve mainly symbolic success with its drones, the Kremlin could cause massive destruction in Kyiv and at the event taking place there.
Flashpoint for War and Diplomatic Isolation
Militarily, Putin holds the upper hand, and politically, it appears similar. The Victory Day parade on May 9 is the most critical holiday in Russia and has high symbolic significance among the population, emphasized by Putin's linkage of the Second World War to the current conflict. An attack on the celebration would trigger a wave of patriotic indignation, particularly if viewers or even veterans of the Great Patriotic War were harmed. Russian propaganda would exploit such incidents to emphasize civilian casualties and galvanize the population.
In terms of domestic politics, Putin would then have a blank check. We cannot predict how Putin would use this leverage. He could, among other things, officially declare war on Kyiv. This would not significantly change the battle front, where war has been raging for over three years. Such an attack does not mean that Putin would use nuclear weapons. However, support for a nuclear "solution" to the conflict would grow among the Russian population. Domestically, the state of war would provide the Kremlin with extensive possibilities, including mobilization. However, this would hardly be necessary, as the army already has enough volunteers. An attack on the parade would further increase the number of volunteers.
International Consequences
Internationally, the repercussions for Kyiv would be grave. If there were a drone attack on the Moscow Victory Parade and a Russian counterattack, Kyiv would bear sole responsibility for the escalation. The reactions of the USA and China are particularly important. For the Trump administration, which is pushing for a quick resolution of the conflict, an attack would be a clear signal that Zelensky wants to continue the war. Relations between Washington and Kyiv could further cool, possibly accompanied by reduced military support or sanctions.
More problematic could be the reaction from Beijing. If Xi Jinping were forced to seek shelter in a bunker, China would have to respond. Neither the leadership nor the Chinese population would tolerate such an affront. Already, Beijing is Russia's most important ally, especially economically, while avoiding direct weapons exports. If Beijing starts supplying Russia with drones or other weapons, it could significantly alter the dynamics on the front. [Enrichment Data: Russia may intensify missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure in response, leading to more destruction. The incident would strain relations with neutral nations and complicate Ukraine's efforts to maintain international support, potentially resulting in reduced military support or sanctions. Russia could damage its moral standing by attacking a WWII memorial event, while China may respond with weapons exports, potentially reshaping the conflict dynamics.]
- The Commission has also been consulted on the draft directive regarding the potential drone attack on Moscow's Victory Day Parade, given its significance in general-news and political contexts.
- The Commission might also contemplate the implications of Ukraine mounting such an attack using long-range drones, such as the UJ-22 Airborne or modified homemade ones, reaching as far as Moscow, considering the technical possibility and the known parade route and date.
- In Kyiv, if a similar event were to happen, the city's vulnerability would be exploited, with Russia having more extensive options than just using slow drones for an attack, given its proximity to Russian-controlled territory such as Chernihiv or Belarus.
- Regardless of the military options available, the Commission should be aware that an attack on either Moscow's Victory Day Parade or Kyiv's commemorative event would have severe international repercussions, potentially leading to diplomatic isolation, reduced financial aid, and increased sanctions for the affected parties.
